

# **Social movements, contestation and direct international rule: Theoretical approaches**

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**Abstract:**

Based on a case study from the Democratic Republic of Congo, the paper discusses theoretical approaches to “direct internationalized rule” and the contestation thereof. Direct internationalized rule is understood as relationships of authority between international actors, such as international organizations, and individuals. Such relationships, it is argued, are increasingly widespread and significant. But how can they be approached analytically? Social movement studies, the global governance perspective, and the governmentality approach are scrutinized in terms of their offerings for an adequate analysis of forms of contestation to direct internationalized rule.

A key assumption about processes of globalization during the last decades is the nation state’s loss of competences. The weakening of state sovereignty is fostered by a continuous increase and expansion of international treaty regimes, intrusions by international organizations (IOs) into various previously “domestic” policy fields, and the takeover of governmental functions by commercial actors and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Globalization contributed to an internationalization of political power and government ‘beyond the state’ (Rose and Miller 1992; Zürn 1998). Some called the result of this process ‘global governance’ (Rosenau 1995), others termed it ‘empire’ (Hardt and Negri 2000). A third cluster of scholars, albeit with strongly differing conceptualizations, detects the

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emergence of a 'world society' or a 'world system' (Wallerstein 1974; Meyer et al. 1997; Stichweh 2000; Schlichte 2005).

Charles Tilly (2009: 15, 53) argues that societal opposition not only interacts with political institutions. He claims that the form of oppositional discourse, practice, and organization, is often actually shaped by the political regime in which it takes place. Tilly shows how social movements in centuries-long processes in Western Europe and North America redirected their claims away from local rulers and strongmen to the national state. Ever since the full development of the modern nation state, the arena and the addressee of popular claims has been this state. The central causes for this development were, in a nutshell, the increasing density of social, political and economic interdependencies within national societies, and the ever-growing powers and competences of the central state at the expense of local rulers. If Tilly's observation is apt, it can be expected that some key characteristics of oppositional politics are about to change due to globalization. When the state loses competences to international actors and structures, and global interdependencies grow denser, oppositional politics may be reshaped, redirected and reformulated.

In this contribution, I am interested in theoretical offerings that can be employed to analyse the intersection between societal contestation and internationalized rule, especially those forms of international authority that may be called "direct", or non-mediated rule. How do forms of contestation change in response to the internationalization of rule? When and why do they take place, can they be effective, and what is their outcome? Does contestation contribute to changes in the form of internationalized rule? My argument is that contemporary relationships of authority between international actors and individuals in the global South call for more refined analytical scrutiny. Existing theoretical approaches do not allow the incorporation of both contestation and internationalized rule in one common analytical framework. Rather, they provide vocabulary to describe only one side of the process, namely either international authorities or the challengers to such authority.

In the present contribution, a number of theoretical approaches to the problem of internationalized rule and contestation are discussed. First, studies dealing primarily with social movements may obviously contribute to such an analysis. Indeed, in recent years a number of publications in this field have dealt with social movements' responses to political globalization.

As a second field, I discuss how societal contestation is understood in theories of international relations (IR), and what contribution IR theories can make to an analysis of societal contestation in the context of internationalized rule.

To illustrate the advantages and disadvantages of particular concepts, I first present a case study of reactions to an international peacebuilding project, a 'Demobilisation and Community Reinsertion' (DCR) programme in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The case study highlights which aspects of opposition to internationalized rule can be described and explained by the theoretical approaches that are debated thereafter. These theoretical perspectives are on the one hand the contentious politics-school, as well as studies of everyday resistance. These approaches have been chosen as the most established sociological perspectives on societal contestation. In the field of IR theories, global governance and global governmentality studies have been selected because both perspectives highlight international and transnational relationships of authority. Each of these three conceptual considerations is sub-divided into an interpretation of the case study, and an examination of remaining theoretical desiderata, blind spots and conceptual limits.

Yet before taking a closer look at the theoretical offerings, the empirical field of study needs to be delineated more precisely. Internationalized rule, in the context of this article, is defined as a form of authority in which international actors count on the high probability that their commands 'with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons' (Weber 1978: 53), and/or 'govern' in the sense that they 'structure the possible field of action of others' (Foucault 1982: 790). This does not mean that nation-states are fully substituted by international actors. Rather, the concept implies that state policies are strongly influenced, or governmental functions in domestic societies are taken over, by international agencies. The ensemble of international actors becomes part of the pre-existing but changing network of institutions governing a political territorial space or groups of persons. The significance of international actors, especially as an ensemble, lies in their asymmetrically high power chances relative to those of societal actors from within a given state and society.

At least three characteristics seem to be inherent to the relationship between networks of organizations involved in international rule, and societal contenders. Firstly, there is a large social and often cultural distance

between international authorities and the given societies. Notions of binding rules and norms are often very different. Secondly, contemporary international rule is often based on a plethora of international organizations that are interlinked with local and national institutions. The hierarchy in such organizational networks, if it exists, may seem unintelligible. Protesting groups thus face the question of who can be held accountable for policies and practices, and who has the power to change them. Thirdly, international rule has specific legitimacy problems, as it runs counter to the norms of people's sovereignty and democracy.

The phenomenon of internationalized rule is most significant in countries undergoing international statebuilding and peacebuilding efforts. In these contexts, "direct" forms of internationalized rule may be observed. The Democratic Republic of Congo is one example of a humanitarian, development, and military intervention space in which IOs such as the United Nations (UN) and its sub-agencies, national development organizations such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and internationally operating development and humanitarian NGOs together form a political authority network. East Timor, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Afghanistan, Liberia, and Haiti are further examples of extremely restricted national sovereignty. In such post-conflict intervention cases, even the most basic domains of the state are taken over by international actors.<sup>2</sup>

Direct authority relationships between international actors and individuals may stand in opposition to "indirect" relationships between these actors. An example for the latter are economic reform programmes fostered by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These may greatly affect individuals, but are mediated by a state, which should assume responsibility for their consequences.<sup>3</sup> In humanitarian military interventions, however, international actors directly communicate with individual human beings. While such direct relationships remain a temporary affair – that is, until

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<sup>2</sup> On international/national/local rule in East Timor see Chopra (2002); in Bosnia Knaus and Martin (2003) and Chandler (2006); in Afghanistan Suhrke (2007); in Liberia Andersen (2010); in Haiti Zanotti (2010); in a comparative perspective see Bliesemann de Guevara (2010).

<sup>3</sup> Also indirect international rule challenges societal contenders. IMF programmes, for example, led to protests in a number of countries and even the fall of governments. In this article, I will however restrict my reflections to direct international rule.

state sovereignty has been reinstalled – in empirical reality such interventions can last for years and even decades. In intervention spaces power relationships between the local and the international are generalized. International organizations address individuals without mediation through their policies, by lecturing them, by offering material benefits, and sometimes by shooting at disobedient subjects (as in the following case study). To contest international intervention policies is particularly difficult for the subjects in question, as the balance of power is extremely asymmetrical, and a legal framework for demanding accountability and making claims does not exist, or only in skeletal form.

Given the element of violent coercion, humanitarian military intervention is a particularly clear demonstration of how direct international rule affects political spaces, and what challenges arise for societal contestation of such rule. Yet instances of direct international rule are not confined to these forms of intervention. Other such instances, of which international development cooperation is clearly the most widespread (Schlichte 2005: 284-295), take place on a daily basis and in locations from the smallest hamlet to the megacities of the global South. Given the size of the accompanying academic apparatus of specialized research units and journals dealing with development, a large amount of scholarly work is dedicated to the analysis of the contestation of development practices. Often, however, these forms of contestation are not defined as opposition, but may rather be understood as responses, for example, the sidetracking of resources (Bierschenk 1988; Olivier de Sardan 2005; Rottenburg 2009). Also the private corporate sector, especially in countries of the global South, sometimes takes over governmental functions in ways reminiscent of colonial concessionaire rule (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1972; Hönke 2009; cf. Ferguson 2005). Another phenomenon involving internationalized rule which gives rise to societal contestation and social movements is flight. This field differs from those mentioned above inasmuch as refugees are subject to a specific international jurisdiction and an IO, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Occasional anti-UNHCR protest has been reported and analysed (Moulin and Nyers 2007). Yet, as in development studies, in refugee studies the interaction of refugees with international actors is often described as tactical cunning rather than open

protest.<sup>4</sup> A final example in this incomplete list may be the emerging field of international justice. In many cases of political conflict, especially in Africa, international courts such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) play an increasing role. As in the case of refugees, an international juridical regime structures these processes.

The field of direct international rule, and the contestation of it, is thus considerable. An analysis of societal contestation would need to take into account and categorize the variety of forms of rule and societal responses. Moreover, since the emergence of a liberal economic and political hegemony after the Cold War, direct international rule has not only continually expanded into new political fields, but also extended further into societal structures. It is thus a field of study that affects an increasing number of people, societal strata and states in “world society”. It employs a large number of IOs, NGOs and other organizations both public and private. Contestation to direct international rule calls for attention, as it is not only significant for the conceptualisation of contemporary social movements, but also telling about the current structure of international relations.

### **Internationalized rule of ex-combatants in the Congo**

These arguments may be exemplified by a case study. During fieldwork in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s district of Ituri in 2005 I encountered widespread complaints by former militia fighters about non-fulfilled pledges made by international intervention agencies. These pledges had been made in the context of a large-scale demobilization programme. The programme aimed to defuse civil war and rebellion in the district, which had been on-going since 1999, by disarming armed groups’ fighters voluntarily. To lure combatants into giving away their main material and political resources, namely membership in a violent organization and the possession of firearms, they had been promised cash and equipment to enable them to set up small businesses. The programme was called ‘Disarmament and Community Reinsertion’ (DCR), and initially ran from 2004 to 2006.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> See e.g. Malkki (1996) and Sommers (2001) on Burundian refugees inside and outside of camps in Tanzania.

<sup>5</sup> See Veit (2010: 153-167 & 201-204) for a detailed analysis of the DCR programme.

As usual in cases of international humanitarian military intervention<sup>6</sup> such as in the DR Congo, an alphabet soup of organizations administered the DCR programme. Financed by the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) cooperated with the national Congolese demobilization agency (CONADER) in the overall DCR management. The United Nations blue-helmet peace mission in the Congo (MONUC) provided security and transported combatants to disarmament sites, which had been constructed by the German national development agency (GTZ). Several local NGOs were tasked with the 'sensitization' of fighters and the on-the-ground implementation of reintegration projects. Besides the voluntarism of the addressees of the programme (i.e. the ex-combatants and the respective communities), the success of DCR thus depended on the managerial competences and cooperation between at least ten different organizations.

However, while demobilization proceeded successfully, the "community reinsertion" part of the programme remained in limbo for months. In practical terms this meant that the provision of cash and equipment was repeatedly postponed. Ex-combatants I encountered and interviewed complained across the board about the social and economic situation they found themselves in. What the *demobilisés* did not know, and had little means of finding out, was why pledges were not being fulfilled. As a researcher with a Western university background I had more possibilities in this regard. My enquiries and observations revealed inter-organizational conflicts between the most important 'stakeholders', UNDP and CONADER, with the funding World Bank in the background. In October 2005 CONADER practically excluded UNDP, which it could do under the given contracts which emphasized national 'ownership' of the programme. A sub-sub-contractor of the USA's government agency USAID replaced UNDP. The newly incoming agency finally implemented the community reinsertion-projects, albeit on a severely reduced budget and providing far fewer opportunities than originally pledged, to the further annoyance of beneficiaries.

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<sup>6</sup> Defined here as interventions into armed conflict that are mandated and/or organized by the United Nations or other international organizations, which involve military troops and are legitimized by humanitarian aims, often the protection of civilians and the restoration of peace.

Ex-combatants responded in various ways to the stalling and subsequent downsizing of the programme. Probably the most widespread reaction was a passive grumbling about the international programme, and the active appropriation of resources on offer. Many ex-combatants were pre-occupied with scraping together the most basic means of living, and abstained from open protest. However, when they were asked to choose from a small selection of potential 'micro-projects', for which they would receive a 'starter kit', a majority of ex-combatants opted for shopkeeping. The respective 'starter kits', containing a variety of household items, meant to constitute their initial stock. Within days, however, the kits' contents were available in Ituri's long-established shops, as ex-combatants sold them wholesale. Hardly any small businesses developed.

The second reaction to unfulfilled pledges was an attempt to create a social movement. One group of ex-combatants organized a demonstration in the district capital Bunia, which drew some few thousand protesters, but was violently dispersed by the police. In November 2005, encouraged by their successful mobilization, the group founded an organization called *Association Solidaire des Ambassadeurs de la Paix en Ituri* (ASAPI). ASAPI, which was joined by several dozen card-carrying members, gave itself a statute detailing internal hierarchies and procedures, and vaguely defined the association's aims. But ASAPI encountered difficulties in being heard by local or international authorities, or even influencing these authorities' political practices. The district commissioner reacted to their demands with reservation, as did other local institutions. Visiting representatives of the World Bank heard their complaints, but permanently installed organizations such as MONUC or UNDP were reluctant to even receive ASAPI's leadership. When it came to ex-combatants' affairs, these agencies restricted dialogue to a limited number of local partners, chiefly the district commissioner and the national demobilization commission CONADER. Furthermore, local NGOs with better reputations, established connections, and experience in project proposal writing had already monopolized the narrow market of internationally financed activities such as information and sensitization campaigns. As their efforts seemed to be fruitless, ASAPI's mobilization capacity waned. By 2008 ASAPI's warehouse-office had been returned to its original uses by other tenants, and the organization had become inactive.



The third choice made by ex-combatants after the disappointing DCR experience was to re-join armed groups. Some military staff of armed groups had never consented with the peace agreement on which DCR was based, and formed new rebel groups to fight the national army and MONUC's blue-helmet troops. Recruits were offered financial rewards ranging, according to rumours, between 25 and 150 US Dollars in one-off payments. Other rumours even held that there would be regular pay for rebels – a rather uncommon practice in the Congo. By 2006, having restored combatant numbers, the rebels had successfully re-conquered large parts of Ituri. The Congolese agency CONADER, after fresh negotiations with rebel groups, set up a new demobilization programme. International organizations abstained from engaging in these Congolese-initiated efforts. MONUC refused negotiations with the rebels, arguing that the time for benefactions was over. The UN later reported that Congolese authorities had disarmed 4,700 fighters, but that 'operational, managerial and financial difficulties of [...] CONADER have significantly hampered the demobilization process' (UN Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR 2009). After a further year of warfare, UNDP and MONUC changed their minds and began negotiations with the rebels, which resulted in another demobilization exercise known as 'Disarmament, demobilization, and reinsertion Phase III'. In November 2007, another 1,800 combatants had gone through demobilization. Ituri then accounted for a quarter of all demobilized combatants in the Congo, but some few hundred or thousand rebels are still active in southern Ituri at the time of writing.

### **Social Movement Studies, Everyday Resistance**

#### ***...and the DCR programme in Ituri***

What immediately springs to mind when examining contestation to internationalized rule are studies in social movements as well as the field of everyday resistance. Ex-combatants in Ituri reacted to the DCR programme in three ways familiar to this scholarly field. First, there was a kind of 'everyday resistance' (Scott 1987; Scott 1992). Individualized attempts to grab what was on offer without investing many resources brings to mind the studies of peasant resistance by James Scott, or what Michel de Certeau calls 'tactics' (de Certeau 1988). In a similar way to the peasants and authorities in South-East Asia described by Scott, a majority of ex-combatants was aware of their very asymmetrical power relationships with

national and international organizations. They accordingly eschewed open revolt in favour of spontaneous attempts to seize opportunities at convenient moments, as happened with the wholesale of starter-kits. Yet, as de Certeau notes, such a tactic is 'an art of the weak', a means of constant improvisation. It is a method of isolated actions, grabbing opportunities, but without a proper place to stockpile 'what it wins'. Such tactics are highly mobile, relying on 'a clever utilization of time', seizing the circumstances that allow a brief transformation of a given figuration into a favourable situation (de Certeau 1988: 36–38). The tactics of Ituri's ex-combatants did turn the DCR programme at least partly into a farce, as they undermined the idea of turning fighters into business entrepreneurs. But IOs still celebrated their programme as a success, while ex-fighters remained far from becoming business entrepreneurs.

ASAPI, the ex-combatant association, provided the second way of responding to unfulfilled pledges. The activists' emphasized their orderly representation of interest. The resource-mobilization school in social movement studies may be most profitably employed to analyse their actions (McAdam et al. 2001). ASAPI reacted to disappointing treatment with a mixture of adaptation and claim-making (Tilly and Tarrow 2007: 1-26). The organization tapped into bureaucratic and symbolic civil society repertoires, not only making use of 'diffusion' and 'brokerage', but also 'shifting scales' between local, national and international levels. Yet while the vocabulary of levels usually refers to different political arenas (such as a national capital or the international sphere), ASAPI tried unsuccessfully to jump scales in one arena, Ituri's capital Bunia, where local, national and international institutions were located (cf. McAdam et al. 2001: 331-336).

Instead of wholesale rejection, ASAPI developed a constructive criticism of the international social engineering efforts. By ascribing to the notion of peace, the associations' members discursively situated themselves on common ground with the international agencies. They reconnected the role of ex-combatants to political life, whereas public and international opinion objectified them as a social problem. ASAPI tried to overcome the notion of ex-combatants as formerly wicked, now dangerous, men who should preferably vanish as a social group, by pointing out their orderliness. However, its members lacked the social and cultural capital, such as connections to international agencies or the ability to write project proposals, needed to gain access to the intervention figuration. The network of

institutions rejected the powerless and – to them at least – suspect ex-combatants as partners. ASAPI's failure to gain recognition demonstrated the problem of meagre resources and opportunities for a social movement of ex-combatants. Their kind of civil society organization was not suited to this form of international authority. In the language of the resource-mobilization school, the opportunity structure of direct international rule was not apt for an ex-combatant organization lacking in resources.

The ex-combatants' third response was most successful in terms of holding international actors to their promises. Re-mobilization into non-state armed organizations and violent rebellion was the most successful response because combatants had viable power resources at hand, namely: guns. While this was a very crude strategy – and for wider society the most detrimental – it forced authorities to react. The example thus shows that analyses of social movements should not erect artificial boundaries between violent and non-violent repertoires of action, as is often done in social movement studies.<sup>7</sup>

### *...and its desiderata*

The vocabulary of studies of social movements in national frames of reference allows a good deal of description of how different social actors reacted to the DCR programme. Yet what about the specificities linked to the international form of rule? Indeed, economic and institutional globalization has tempted social scientists to look for parallel developments in the protest and resistance scenery. Many regarded the alter-globalization movement<sup>8</sup> as a sign of increasing transnationalization of social movement activity. Charles Tilly summed up this argument in figure 1, with 'claimants' being social movements and 'objects of claims' being authorities.

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<sup>7</sup> The resumption of warfare and the remobilization of combatants in Ituri in 2006 had various complex causes, of which the failing DCR programme was only one part. For details see Veit (2010).

<sup>8</sup> Or anti-globalization movement or global justice movement, as it has been termed alternatively, which gained strength from around 1995.




Figure 1: Internationalization of social movements (from Tilly and Wood 2009: 113)

It may, however, be doubted that an internationalization or transnationalization of social movement activity is the only, or even the most widespread and significant reaction to globalization. At least this is indicated by the instances of direct international rule and its contestation pointed out above, which have hardly brought about transnational claim-making, but rather a wide array of localized reactions.

Moreover, the literature on transnational social movements suffers from two shortcomings that prevent it from providing meaningful hints on the above described phenomena of international rule and contestation. First, while research on “national” oppositions has for decades reflected the historicity of their object (Tilly 1986; Hanagan et al. 1998; Tilly and Wood 2009), this is not the case for transnational movements studies (cf. Brecher et al. 2000; Della Porta and Tarrow 2005; Della Porta et al. 2006). Such presentism is at risk of overstating the newness of international connections between social movements, echoing the overexcited debates on the supposed novelty of globalization in the 1990s. Statements like ‘[o]ver the last quarter-century, we have witnessed a sea-change in the nature of leftist activism’ (Reitan 2007: 1) do not adequately characterize change and continuity of transnational contention.

More prudently, Sidney Tarrow acknowledges that contemporary transnational activism may only differ, rather than being an entire novelty compared to earlier periods, in that 'it involves a broader spectrum of ordinary peoples and elites, and that it extends to a wider range of domestic and international concerns' (Tarrow 2005: 4). Yet contestation across borders and involving authorities active across national borders has always been an important defining feature of globalization. For example, the 19<sup>th</sup>-century mobilization against slave trade and slavery, the Socialist International, and the anti-colonial struggles in the 20<sup>th</sup> century all had strong, at periods defining international characteristics besides local and national elements. Crossing national boundaries has for centuries been a widespread phenomenon. Activists exchanged theoretical and practical ideas, mobilized internationally, and adapted successful forms of activism from other countries. At the same time, they often failed to maintain their organized solidarity, as in the case of the Second Socialist International in the face of nationalism during World War I. Tarrow further argues that 'what is most striking about the new transnational activism is both its connection to the current wave of globalisation and its relation to the changing structure of international politics' (Tarrow 2005: 4). Yet how the international political structure has changed since about 1990, and what role contestation played in the process, needs to be analysed before being declared revolutionary.

The second shortcoming of this strand of literature is a restricted focus on Western democracies. Such geographical limits have a longer tradition in social movement studies, especially in theoretical works. Charles Tilly even insists that social movements in the modern sense are original products of European and North American democracy (Tilly and Wood 2009: 5). While such a view has its merits, allowing for a delineation of how social movements can be defined, it risks neglecting 'popular politics in most of the world' (Chatterjee 2004). A restricted focus on social movements in Western democracies is all the more surprising in literature on actors who are centrally concerned with problems in non-Western regions, such as poverty or human rights violations.

When non-Western actor groups are included in the analysis, the cases are very often drawn from Latin America, where the social movement scene is in many respects similar to Western democracies. Another tendency is to only look at cases in which Western activists denounce conflicts and interactions taking place between actors from the global South (such as

female circumcision in Africa) (Keck and Sikkink 1998).<sup>9</sup> The most prominent volumes on transnational activism feature no analysis, or only briefly touch upon activism in Africa and Asia (Brecher et al. 2000; Smith and Johnston 2002; della Porta and Tarrow 2005; Tarrow 2005; della Porta et al. 2006). This circumstance mirrors the empirical problem of African social movements' relative lack of resources, which gives rise to difficulties in being heard in the international media, and an imbalance in power relations between Africans and non-Africans in transnational action networks as well as in the academic sphere.

### **Global governance studies**

#### *...and the DCR programme in Ituri*

Traditional approaches to IR, i.e. (neo)realist and liberal theories, disqualify for the analysis of contestation to international rule because of their exclusive focus on the nation state. International organizations or societal forces are not taken into account as actors in their own right, while the DCR programme in Ituri as well as opposition to it was clearly driven by such actors. A more fruitful approach may be the concept of global governance, an approach that has become increasingly influential in sections of IR scholarship, e.g. in Germany (Deitelhoff and Wolf 2009: 458-460). The global governance perspective seems promising, as the concept enables a description of the impact of globalization on political institutions. One of its key assumptions is that authority is wielded also, but not exclusively, by the state. While states are regarded as important players, other actors, institutions and phenomena 'such as global social movements; civil society; the activities of international organisations; the changing regulative capacity of states; private organisations; public-private networks; transnational rule making; and forms of private authority' must also be taken into account (Dingwerth and Pattberg 2006: 189). The global governance approach is interested in systems of authority on every societal 'level', from the family to the international arena, provided that 'the exercise of control' in these authority systems 'has transnational repercussions' (Rosenau 1995: 13). The concept is thus geared to understand linkages between the global, regional and local 'policy levels'. The important 'benefit of including these questions in the notion of global governance', as summed up by Klaus Dingwerth and

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<sup>9</sup> The volume by Khagram et al. (2002) balanced this bias.

Philipp Pattberg (2006: 192), 'derives from the importance these linkages have in real life.'

The global governance concept provides a clear definition of its object, which is its most important analytical asset. The structure of political authority in Ituri included a number of international organizations, foreign national development agencies, local and international NGO, and Congolese national agencies as well as local governmental structures. This governance network, as already described, failed to live up to the pledges given to ex-combatants, pledges that should not be regarded as a mere show of goodwill. After all, the DCR programme was meant to contribute to a transition from war to peace in a region ravaged by deadly conflict, and failure to do so encouraged the resumption of fighting. Thus the question of accountability – who was responsible for this disappointment – inevitably arises. During fieldwork, fingers were always pointed to the respective other organization. It remained unclear who was indeed responsible for the management of the programme. Was it the Congolese government agency CONADER, which was largely dysfunctional and sidelined during the later stages of the process? Was it the World Bank as the funding organization? Or UNDP, which initiated the exercise?

Multi-stakeholder global governance structures may reduce an individual organization's awareness of responsibility for the joint task. Officials involved in the DCR programme repeatedly pointed fingers at partnering organizations that supposedly inhibited the programme's success, while simultaneously denying any shortcomings of their own organizations. Yet how can we explain why organizations given a relatively simple task (providing some business opportunities to a limited number of people) fail to live up to that task? And why would these organizations be so unresponsive to civic complaints, turning violence into the only language they were willing to hear? A number of recent works argue that when IOs and NGOs are understood as bureaucracies, such apparent dysfunctions can be explained. Organizational self-interest, discursive framing and inter-organizational friction may all have played a role. Yet none of these works is manifest in global governance studies; rather, a political economy approach (Cooley and Ron 2002) or a constructivist approach is taken (Barnett & Finnemore 2004), or reference is made to ideas from organizational sociology (Lipson 2007).

*...and its desiderata*

A global governance approach seems perfectly suited for shedding light on the confusing network of institutions in Ituri, as well as its nexus with Ituri's society. Yet a closer look at a case study reveals that the perspective seems to offer very little either in theoretical or methodical terms. Part of the reason for this theoretical/methodical gap is perhaps the state-centred IR heritage, which has not been fully overcome. So far the lack of a social theory, or at least a vocabulary for naming social figurations beyond formal organizations, relegates the global governance approach to the status of a post-traditional international relations theory. Global governance studies tend to look at the world 'from above', whereas politics 'from below' (Bayart 2008) is not on the map. While the comparatively disorderly, unorganized or informally organized have thus not yet become an object of analytical scrutiny, some global governance authors present the approach as being concerned with its antidote. The central themes of global governance, according to this strand of scholars, are order, control and the steering of the world (Dose 2008; Mayntz 2008).

Even when contestation is explicitly analyzed, resistance to global governance actors is defined as a non-intended side-effect (Zürn et al. 2007) rather than understood as an integral part of the construction and deconstruction of (global) rule. Accordingly, resistance can only be understood as the prevention of governance or the undermining of social order, rather than as a productive political force (Risse and Lehmkuhl 2006). Also this perspective can be traced back to a certain heritage. In a seminal text, James Rosenau and Ernst Otto Czempiel spelled out a paradigm of negotiation, cooperation and compromise that rested on the idea that single actors were forced to cooperate because of their inability to resolve global problems on their own (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992). Global governance is defined by some scholars, in tandem with policy-makers, as a political programme for the cooperative resolution (or at least management) of supra-national problems (Dingwerth and Pattberg 2006: 189-196), turning global governance into a theory of post-political administration (Latham 1999). Conflict and asymmetrical power relations fade into analytical oblivion (Behrens 2004). While empirical analytical approaches to global governance seek to overcome this normatively laden perspective, some 'minimal normativity' in the sense that 'governance-outputs are goods, not



bad's' (Teilprojekt A1 2009: 5, my translation) seems to remain in the global governance analytical mainstream.

### **Global governmentality studies**

#### *...and the DCR programme in Ituri*

Another increasingly influential concept for the analysis of internationalized authority is posited by global governmentality studies. The term governmentality has been coined by Michel Foucault, and refers to the connection between government and mentality. The neologism is applied to governing actors, their reasoning, goals and means, and their 'techniques of domination', i.e. the institutions and practices that regulate social conduct. This form of authority is centrally based on the consent of the governed. It is the encounter of techniques applied by others with techniques 'of the self' which results in a 'governmentalized' societal structure. The governed voluntarily consent and conduct themselves in ways demanded and expected by those governing. Government and population share a single governmentality, which is entrenched in corresponding subjectivities. Power in this model is first and foremost about shaping the field of possible action of subjects, who in response develop forms of self-government. Governmentality is, like global governance, a perspective that emphasizes consensus between those who govern and those governed (Foucault 1991; Lemke 2002; Ziai 2006: 70-74; Joseph 2010: 223-224).

Foucault developed the concept to analyse the European case in a particular historical context, rather than positing the concept as a universal theoretical device. He argues that the idea of government being primarily concerned with populations emerged in the late seventeenth century in Western Europe. The new form of governmental reasoning gradually amended older forms of sovereign power that were primarily concerned with discipline and controlling territory. European governments, including affiliated philosophers and the social sciences, developed laissez-faire policies for achieving prosperous political economies. Government limited itself as a means of rational domination (Foucault 1991). Ruling actors' self-limitation, which can also be understood as 'governing at a distance' (Rose and Miller 1992), was possible because 'multiple bodies, forces, energies, matters, desires, thoughts and so on are gradually, progressively, actually and materially constituted as subjects.' (Foucault 2004: 28) The matrix of rule

expands into society, which becomes subject to and agent of its own subjectivation (Reckwitz 2008: 23-39).

Governmentality may thus be understood as a theory of liberal rule. Examples of how subjects consent to their own subjugation are easily to be found in contemporary Europe and North America, for example in the field of welfare politics. Nonetheless, even in the Western context the governmentality paradigm is often applied in a generalized sense and with little regard for the actual results of governmental discourse and policies (cf. Finsch 2002). As a concept developed for a different context, the application of a governmentality perspective in non-Western countries demands even greater analytical caution. It needs to be questioned whether international as well as national or local authorities and subjects of rule in the global South indeed share a common political subjectivity, and if their common idea of government is primarily concerned with the well-being of populations. Nonetheless, a growing body of global governmentality studies has developed over recent years (see e.g. Duffield 2001; Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Larner and Walters 2004; Sending and Neumann 2006; de Larrinaga and Doucet 2010).

The DCR programme in Ituri was a rather obvious instance of a neoliberal governmentality. The underlying idea of 'community reinsertion' was that individuals should become business entrepreneurs. Once ex-combatants went into fishing, farming or shop keeping, emerging commercial interdependencies would raise the cost of violence. Peace would be in the interest of ex-combatants, who would accordingly assume a civic conduct. This approach's rationality is derived from political economy, which according to Foucault is the genuine language of governmentality. At the same time, the idea was extremely naive, since it took little consideration of Ituri's economic situation. Ex-combatants who lost no time with their 'starter-kits' seem to have understood better that they stood little chance of earning a living by putting up another small market stall besides existing ones. The district's economy was destroyed by decades of state exploitation and civil war. Ex-combatants thus called for university education, or machinery for farming, cheese dairies, and fisheries. Their ideas revolved around migration as university students or export production. They believed they could make it when given the opportunity. Many ex-combatants shared a neoliberal, entrepreneurial governmentality; their consensus with the international approach to peace through business was

most symbolically shared by the failed NGO ASAPI, which demanded the fulfilment of peacebuilders' pledges eagerly but in an orderly manner.

*...and its desiderata*

Why, then, did the DCR programme fail despite the governmentality consensus between international agencies and their subjects? A profound criticism of Anglophone governmentality studies is provided by Jonathan Joseph, who argues that 'in practice, neoliberal governmentality cannot be a universally valid technique' because 'outside of the social conditions of advanced liberal capitalism' the respective policies of international institutions are bound to fail (Joseph 2009: 425). The author criticizes that many governmentality studies restrict their analyses to abstract ideas and practices rather than concrete results in societies targeted by international actors. These studies fail to adequately account for instances of 'failed governmentality' (Joseph 2009: 420). Furthermore he posits that actual neoliberal policies, such as the International Monetary Fund's Structural Adjustment Programmes, are quite often coercively imposed on countries. As coercion is not at the centre of the governmentality paradigm, the perspective adds little to the understanding of these practices. Joseph concludes that governmentality studies actually focus on the relationships between international institutions and nation states, but not populations, because the policies of international actors usually target states. He calls this targeting of populations through influencing governments 'governmentality once removed' (Joseph 2009: 424). This branch of IR studies thus, like many global governance studies, restricts itself to indirect relations of power between international actors and local populations.

How far does this criticism carry? As mentioned above, the problem in Ituri was not the subjectivities of ex-combatants, even if they did not directly experience 'the social conditions of advanced liberal capitalism' (Joseph 2009: 425). Whether governmentality approaches fail because of a subjectivity gap, or inappropriate social structures, needs to be researched more closely in individual cases. Yet Joseph may have a valid point regarding the question of coercion: While demobilization was presented as voluntary, the UN mission MONUC made it clear that non-compliers would be treated as criminals (Veit 2010: 156). Subsequently, ex-combatants were not allowed to adequately participate in the community reinsertion scheme. Finally, those who re-mobilized were violently confronted.

Beyond Anglophone governmentality studies, Jean-François Bayart employs the governmentality paradigm in his description of the '*gouvernement du monde*' in a different, more encompassing sense. Bayart's political sociology lacks neither a historical perspective, as he describes the fundamentals of contemporary globalization as dating back at least to the nineteenth century, nor does he eschew an analysis of the societal consequences and responses to globalization (Bayart 2007: 28). He argues that current globalization processes are fuelled on the one hand by what others term institutions of global governance, i.e. states, IOs, private corporations and NGOs. On the other hand, there is an 'appropriation [of globalization] by the masses', who pick up and reformulate the newly emerging opportunities (Bayart 2007: 290). This encounter between domination and processes from below, however, does not result in global governmentality, a global "we" or a homogenous form of global authority. The various, often contradictory, engagements result rather in the 'heterogeneity, incompleteness and contingency of the "event of globalization."' (Bayart 2007: 28)

Yet Bayart's insightful historical sociology of political globalization also has its limits for the study of opposition to internationalized rule. Studies of global governance as well as global governmentality tend to evade the question whether liberal prescriptions for the non-Western world work, or what effects (intended or unintended) they result in. Bayart embraces the agency of the ruled, yet only to dissolve it into globalized subjectivities. The result of opposition is always already there, as part and parcel of a contradictory process giving rise to ever-new patterns and practices of globalization. Consider anti-colonial resistance, a significant historical form of opposition to international rule: 'The spread and naturalization of the state "imported" into Africa and Asia thus happened through anti-colonial struggles: the white man has been chased away, but his ideological and institutional baggage has been kept' (Bayart 2007: 26). Yet did anti-colonial movements struggle against statehood, or rather against being ruled by foreigners? Similarly, militant Islamism unfailingly reproduces the nation state (which is in Bayart's view – to which I agree – a product of globalization) instead of creating a 'green international' (Bayart 2007: 80), the alter-globalization movement 'reconfigure[d] the public space worldwide' (Bayart 2007: 263) and the spread of terrorist suicide attacks from Sri Lanka to New York is interpreted as a 'global political technique of

the body' (Bayart 2007: 264). In a nutshell, protest invariably contributes to globalization. The point here is not that these assertions are wrong; the problem is rather that such an interpretation analyses everything from its result, and leaves little room for considering the emergence and development of social movements and their members' subjectivities in their own right.

### **Conclusion**

In this contribution it has been argued that globalization entails forms of direct international rule, which have been conceptualized as relationships of authority between international actors and individuals. Humanitarian military interventions, development cooperation, refugee regimes, and the takeover of governmental functions by private corporations are widespread forms of internationalized rule in the global South, where they become increasingly involved in the regulation of societies. Given that structures of authority interact with, and often shape societal opposition, it can be expected that particular forms of contestation to such rule emerge. As has been shown by a case study on the DR Congo's peace process, the emergence, form, outcomes of local opposition may range from individualised everyday resistance to NGO activity, and even violent rebellion; from tactical appropriation to sustained activism; and of course from failure to the effective defence of interests. Also institutional responses to such contestation, often by international organizations, not only vary from ignorance to appeasement strategies, but are also telling about the self-perception of contemporary global authorities.

The article examined which theoretical approaches can be usefully employed to analyse such phenomena. Social movement and everyday resistance studies, it has been argued, provide a useful vocabulary for grasping these practices of contestation. This strand of literature takes a perspective on politics "from below", which allows the identification of repertoires, practices of jumping scales, and opportunity structures for social movements. However, the literature on social movements in contemporary globalization currently overemphasizes the "newness" of these phenomena, lacking as it does a historical perspective on societal contestation in general. Furthermore, its focus is mostly restricted to Western democracies, thus ignoring 'politics in most of the world' (Chatterjee 2004). Disregard for the global South runs the risk of missing the

most significant new and continuing forms of contestation to internationalized rule.

The global governance perspective on world politics, on the other hand, describes the institutional setup of current forms of internationalized rule. The alphabet soup of international organizations, international NGOs, private corporations and state institutions that together form regimes of authority in many political spaces, are adequately defined as global governance networks. However, the perspective does not seem to live up to its promises, as it lacks a theoretical place for informally or non-organized organized actors. Especially those who are excluded from governance structures fall off the analytical landscape. Global governance's view from above thus needs to be completed with a view on "politics from below". This would not only be necessary for a better understanding of contestation to internationalized rule, but also in order to minimize the risk of taking the effectiveness of governance policies for granted.

Global governmentality studies, the second IR approach under scrutiny, also tends to limit its analysis to governance institutions and their practices. Governmentality studies are well-positioned to analyse the rationale of governance. Yet many studies only give minor attention to societal actors' subjectivities, and the question of whether governance policies actually work. Moreover, taking overlapping or complementary subjectivities between rulers and the ruled for granted raises the risk of overlooking important aspects. In particular, governance subjects' subjectivities may conflict with the rationale of ruling institutions, even if asymmetrical power relationships lead to a supposed consensus.

Concepts of international relations or social movements on their own may not explain every aspect of contestation of internationalized rule. While IR long neglected the articulation of societal actors in international politics, the latter restricted its focus to the nation state. A political sociology of contestation of internationalized rule needs to carve out the overlapping aspects of studies of contention and everyday resistance on the one hand, and IR perspectives such as global governance and governmentality on the other. It is in these overlapping aspects where the theoretical place of contestation to international rule is situated and can be analysed in one common analytical framework.

**Abstract:**

Der Beitrag diskutiert ausgehend von einer Fallstudie zur Demokratischen Republik Kongo theoretische Ansätze zu Auseinandersetzungen um „direkte internationalisierte Herrschaft“ („*direct internationalized rule*“). Direkte internationalisierte Herrschaft wird dabei als Herrschaftsbeziehung zwischen Individuen und internationalen Akteuren, etwa Internationalen Organisationen, verstanden. Beziehungen dieser Art sind zunehmend verbreitet und bedeutsam. Wie jedoch sind sie analytisch zu fassen? Der Text untersucht Ansätze der Bewegungsforschung, der Forschung zu Global Governance sowie zu Gouvernamentalität daraufhin, welchen Beitrag sie zur Analyse direkter internationalisierter Herrschaft leisten können.

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