Review Article

Sovereignty, Socialism and Development in Postcolonial Tanzania

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John Magufuli, Tanzania’s President since November 2015, has reminded some observers in the media and social networks of the country’s first President and revered Baba wa Taifa (“Father of the Nation”), Julius Nyerere. Nyerere ruled the country from independence until 1985 and tried, over two decades, to lead Tanzania to socialism and self-reliance. Two decades after Nyerere stepped down, following structural adjustment and reforms of mostly neoliberal orientation between 1986 and 2015, the new president draws – consciously, but selectively – on the past. A central figure in the
repertoire is the figure of Nyerere, who has become “a widely shared political metaphor used to debate and contest conceptions of the Tanzanian nation and Tanzanian-ness” (Fouéré 2015).

Much like the incorruptible Nyerere, Magufuli has successfully nurtured an image of embracing hard work, austerity and efficiency. His hands-on-attitude is reflected in a crackdown on tax evaders and the speedy dismissal of corrupt civil servants in the name of public interests. Critical voices from the Tanzanian opposition as well as national and international media, however, have pointed out that in the first year of his regency, Magufuli has displayed worrying authoritarian tendencies (for instance, Kabwe 2016). The “Bulldozer,” as he is nicknamed, devised means to silence the opposition, muzzled three newspapers and two radio stations, and charged at least ten people under a new law on cybercrime for insulting the president on social media (as of September 2016, see Kuo 2016). The display of political power, which meets with both applause and distrust of the Tanzanian public, goes hand in hand with several protectionist measures meant to catalyse economic growth, some of which recall Nyerere’s vision of self-reliance.

It is not only for such distorted echoes of the past, but for a plethora of reasons that Tanzania’s postcolonial history has continued to attract scholars. While some scholars have emphasized continuity and praise Tanzania as shining example of political stability since independence – the ruling party has been in power for 55 years now, managing the transition from one-party rule to multi-party democracy – others have highlighted ruptures and the exceptionality of the socialist Ujamaa period. Ujamaa has been hailed for being an internationally influential, egalitarian, anti-racist, vision of modernity, though its results were mixed, at best. It has also been dismissed as a misconceived, authoritarian, economically devastating and ultimately failed experiment which precipitated the malaise of the 1980s and the transformation to multi-party democracy. Four recent monographs about Tanzania after 1960 enrich the existing literature with new perspectives on scales from household and village conflicts to global struggles, leaving the reader with a wide choice between narratives of success and failure, stability and fragmentation, authoritarianism and emancipation.
The Establishment of Sovereignty

In *Building a Peaceful Nation*, Paul Bjerk asks how Tanzania’s leaders, facing a plethora of destabilizing influences similar to those that befell most African states after independence, managed to forge a stable, sovereign state in the years between 1960 and 1964. Bjerk’s narrative is a story of success, an “Afro-optimist” account pitted against the “Afro-pessimist” mainstream opinion of failed states and corrupt elites in Africa. By means of “discursive agency”, Bjerk claims, Julius Nyerere and a handful of other high-ranking politicians including Rashidi Kawawa and Oscar Kambona creatively, competently, responsibly and successfully balanced political demands from pressure groups in the country and avoided the cliffs in riding with the tides of the global Cold War.

The first part of the book sketches the biographical trajectory of Nyerere as a young man. Bjerk outlines how Nyerere’s political thinking was shaped by his upbringing and education in Tanganyika and Edinburgh (Scotland), drawing attention to the fact that the tension between efficient autocracy and consensus-oriented democracy which was to mark his presidency already bedevilled him as a young intellectual. Falling short of a real biography – Tom Molony recently published a much more detailed account with his *Nyerere. The Early Years* – this section introduces the monograph’s main protagonist. Doing this, it serves as a kind of prelude to the two major parts of the book which deal with the construction of internal and external sovereignty.

The part on internal sovereignty shows how Nyerere and his allies registered victories in containing crises. The most serious of these was the 1964 mutiny of the Tanganyika Rifles of which Bjerk provides the most detailed account so far, presenting the unfolding of events on a day-to-day basis. The government also averted pressure from fellow party members, the rivalling ANC and large sections of the labour movement for a racialisation of recruitment policies under the slogan of “Africa for Africans.” Bjerk convincingly argues that the mutiny was a welcome pretext for the leadership to disband the popular and influential union movement. The reader also learns more about the role of two other institutions that have received too little scholarly attention so far, namely the TANU Youth
Stichproben

League and the National Service, also called JKT (Jeshi la Kujenga Taifa, literally, Nation-building Army). Both institutions instilled discipline and a patriotic habitus, meant to tie the nation’s youth closer to the party and the state. Yet, members of the TANU Youth League not only served as auxiliaries and arms of the political elite, but also followed their own, more radical agendas when they policed communities, raided Asians’ shops and arrested persons, acting as a *de facto* executive (Bjerk 2015: 164).

Somewhat surprisingly and certainly long overdue in political histories of (postcolonial) African states, Bjerk makes use of ethnographic studies about age-set rule, rites of passage and patronage to illuminate power structures in postcolonial Tanzania. The results of this move are uneven. His resort to cultural continuities and re-workings is fertile and well-argued in the case of the postulated link between “traditional” relations of youth, governance, and gerontocratic patronage on the one hand and “modern” youth organisations such as the TANU Youth League and the National Service on the other hand; it remains on a more superficial level where he discusses labour and land.

The second major part of the book investigates Tanganyikas’s manoeuvres in the international sphere. Here, Bjerk documents TANU’s early commitment to promote an explicitly Pan-African liberation struggle which took off with the establishment of PAFMECA (*Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa*) in 1958. He argues that this commitment was based on ideals, but, in strategic terms, can only be interpreted as realist, as the threat of white minority regimes and Portuguese colonialism was all too real. Strategic realism, Bjerk maintains, also marked Nyerere’s plans for regional integration, the diversification of international political bonds and the support for liberation movements. In 1962, Dar es Salaam became the seat of the OAU’s Liberation Committee and Tanganyika strengthened its function as a hub for Chinese and East European military aid and a springboard for freedom fighters’ deployment to military training camps in Cuba, China or Algeria. By drawing attention to the early years of the support for liberation movements, *Building a Peaceful Nation* delivers proof that the foreign policy strategy of diversification was well in place before the major crises in foreign relations with the US, UK and West Germany occurred in 1964-65. Finally, Bjerk also offers an account of the
birth of the Union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar in 1964 which he interprets as a quick-witted move of Nyerere to avoid superpower interference. This narrative is solid, but marred by an almost exclusive reliance on British and American sources; also, despite some new details, it adds little to the literature on this topic (Sanders 2014, Shivji 2008, and the more controversial Wilson 2013).

While there is very little that one can criticise on a factual basis, Bjerk’s framing does have some problematic implications. There is, for instance, his rationalisation of Nyerere’s resort to non-democratic means. The introduction of the one-party state, the Preventive Detention Act and the liquidation of the independent unions are all rendered legitimate or even inevitable by Bjerk through references to constraints and context. This effort boils down to the statement that “democracy was sacrificed for the sake of sovereignty; but it is hard to imagine any other course” (Bjerk 2015: 5). While Bjerk acknowledges the danger of legitimating what he calls “authoritarian constraints,” (Bjerk 2015: 268) he is quick to highlight that these constraints were also useful. Apart from this position, which is highly debatable, reproducing as it does a top-down perspective, there are a couple of methodological points that are interrelated with these political implications, and hence also deserve scrutiny. The usefulness of the conceptual framework is doubtful, especially because the link between two main analytical categories, “sovereignty” and “discursive agency,” remains undertheorised and adds little insight to the dense and empirically saturated narrative Bjerk provides. In the end, his account amounts to a Rankean history of big men’s decisions shaping “their” states. When Bjerk quotes his interviewees – including key political actors of the 1960s like Rashidi Kawawa and Job Lusinde – the quotes are often not more than re-statements of official ideology, nor are they subjected to source criticism. Additionally, the biographies (and “discursive agency”) of these politicians other than Nyerere would deserve more analytical attention but are mostly sidelined, remaining in Nyerere’s shadow. Nyerere’s influence on Tanzanian history, however, is well-established (more insights can probably only be expected once new archival evidence becomes available), while internal power struggles in the political elite remain obscure, and Building a Peaceful Nation adds little to answer these questions. What Bjerk does answer, using an impressive amount of sources, is the question how
Nyerere successfully navigated among manifold political challenges, turning Tanganyika – a mandate territory extremely neglected by Great Britain – into a sovereign state that enjoyed reputation and influence both within and beyond its borders.

The Rise of Authoritarianism

The second big task that Tanzania’s leaders saw themselves confronted with after (or along with) establishing sovereignty was improving the living standard of the population. A campaign to bring together rural populations in villages so that they could collectively produce and access the state’s basic social services became a central endeavour of the state between 1969 and 1975. The so-called “villagisation” campaign was embedded in the wider conceptual framework of self-reliance and Ujamaa, Tanzania’s version of African socialism. It was the largest resettlement campaign in Africa, affecting – estimations differ – between eight and thirteen million Tanzanians, in any way, the majority of the country’s population.

In Government of Development. Peasants and Politicians in Postcolonial Tanzania Leander Schneider asks how the promising project of rural-based development could turn from its tenets of local decision-making, communalism and emancipation into state-led authoritarian practices. In short: How did bottom-up become top-down? Materialist explanations for the authoritarian turn have been brought forward in neo-Marxist writings from what Schneider calls the “Dar school” (such as Issa Shivji’s work on the “bureaucratic bourgeoisie,”, see Shivji 1978) as well as the liberal-minded “New Political Economy” with its rational-choice methodology (as represented by Robert Bates and Michael Lofchie, see Bates 1981, Lofchie 2014). These accounts have treated Tanzania’s villagisation campaign as the outcome of the ruling class’ efforts to extract surplus from the peasantry. Rural development thus was meant to fortify the dominant position. Schneider is not convinced by this. The Leadership Code of the Arusha Declaration (1967), for instance, forbade officials to have second incomes or even own second homes to rent out for profit. Practices of government,
Schneider argues, cannot be causally explained with a simplistic resort to the ruling elite’s economic self-interest. Instead, he proposes to embed the villagisation campaign within the contingent and richly textured constellations and discourses of the time.

After a useful thematic and theoretical introduction, the book starts off with a chapter on the Ruvuma Development Association (RDA), the organisation that has been credited to be one of the most important sources of inspiration for *Ujamaa*’s emphasis on communal village life. Schneider portrays a functioning communal, cooperative project based on democratic and voluntary participation without need for large amounts of neither external capital nor much influence from the state (Schneider 2014: 37). The villages that took part in the RDA’s activities speedily exhibited results, living standards increased and the villages became models of how *Ujamaa* villages were to look like.

The aspect of autonomy, however, became the central point of concern for officials, as they felt that the RDA undermined the state’s (and the party’s) supreme role in leading development. The shutdown of the RDA through members of TANU’s Central Committee in 1969, described in chapter two, marked a turning point in Tanzanian history and symbolised the rise of “state officials’ developmentalist authority in action” (Schneider 2014: 69). This “developmentalist authority” is the subject of chapter three. The campaign for collectivisation initially relied on persuasion but turned coercive and, increasingly, violent. People were forced to leave their plots and their homes, which in some cases were burned down to prevent return. Often, this excess has been interpreted as a divergence between Nyerere’s good intentions and his subordinates’ bad practices. However, as Schneider points out, it was by no means only the zealouslyness of administrators who – for better or worse – “misunderstood” Nyerere’s benevolent tenets; rather, Nyerere’s discourses about self-determination, progress and knowledge were already inherently ambivalent and portrayed the peasants as backward and unknowing, while officials and “experts” personified superior and “modern” knowledge.

Chapter four discusses techniques of planning as a practice that further entrenched the administrators’ self-image as being modern and rational. While the plans itself were mostly useless, the planning process, according
to Schneider, was instrumental in legitimating the authority that officials assumed over peasants’ lives. The fifth chapter offers a detailed and insightful discussion of mid-level officials’ interests and practices. Sandwiched between local strongmen and national superiors, they mostly opted to give in to top-down pressure to deliver quick results, i.e., getting as many people as possible into villages. At times, however, officials also devised means of keeping up appearances and set up Potemkin villages rather than actually establishing and populating new settlements (Schneider 2014: 133).

While Bjerk has made “discursive agency” the central point of his analysis, focussing on actors, Schneider pays more attention to discourse and subjectivities. The investigation of layers of meaning, however, is not an end in itself. Insights drawn from the analysis of discourses inform his reading of practices on the ground “as constituted in ‘thick’ discursive practices, while making room for contingency and non-functionality in history’s making” (Schneider 2014: 167). The documents which Schneider unearthed in the archives, especially in the National Archive’s branches in Dodoma and Mwanza, form the empirical backbone of his argument and allow him to identify concrete tensions and animosities which would remain concealed if he had only relied on newspapers and interviews. Illuminating case studies (for instance, Schneider 2014: 142-144) unveil the highly personalised feuds and skirmishes between officials or politicians, and how these influenced the implementation of national policies.

What Schneider possibly underestimates in his account is that bureaucrats turned to authoritarianism not only because they had incorporated a developmentalist outlook, but also – as Göran Hydén (1980: 106) has shown – because they had, before 1974, few means at their disposal to influence smallholder farmers. Taxation of rural households had been abolished while price incentives were ruled out because they were thought to increase inequalities and thus contradicted egalitarian principles which formed one of Ujamaa’s legitimating pillars. At times, one might wish for a few generalised statements on constraints of officials’ agency, or their interests, or conflicting factions. But maybe, the messy reality in which the borders between government, party and administration are blurred, as was the case in Tanzania, cannot be neatly captured in a few axiomatic statements.
Be that as it may, *Government of Development* can definitely be recommended. The writing style and the frequent entanglement of narrative and theoretical reflection makes clear that the audience Schneider had in mind is well-versed (or at least interested) in academic debates. Delivering dense, but always readable information and nuanced analysis, this monograph is not only an indispensable addition for a deeper understanding of one of the most important episodes in Tanzania’s history, but also successfully contributes to on-going and practically relevant debates on governance and development.

**The complexities of African Socialism**

Priya Lal, in her monograph about *African Socialism in Postcolonial Tanzania*, rejects the question of why *Ujamaa* failed as misleading, not least because the teleological assumption of failure tends to seriously hamper historical inquiry. Failure, for Lal, is the wrong point of departure. Rather, she is interested in finding out what *Ujamaa* “actually was,” that is, how it was imagined, understood, practised and contested (Lal 2015: 6). In the programmatic introduction, Lal clarifies that what can be gained from such a comprehensive treatment of *Ujamaa* as both imagined and practiced is that an open-ended approach unveils “the dialectical friction at the heart of processes of state formation, socialism and national development across postcolonial contexts;” it sheds light on what she calls “tensions of national development” and unsettles notions of “how we understand development in general” (Lal 2015: 10).

The originality of Lal’s *African Socialism in Postcolonial Tanzania* is mirrored in its very structure, as all chapters take a different spatial unit of enquiry. Passing from the global via the national to the regional and village level, Lal reveals the entangled nature of processes and events that were both bound to but also transcended these different levels. The book’s subtitle, *Between the Village and the World*, captures this interest in the interrelations between spatial units.
The first chapter firmly places the ambiguous conception of *Ujamaa* in the global Cold War world. Lal transcends the old, and ultimately unproductive, debate on whether *Ujamaa* is "African" or "Western" by pointing to its multiple sources and inspirations. These include Pan-Africanism with its re-validation of rural traditions, Third World Socialism and in particular Maoism and the Cultural Revolution, as well as late colonial development discourses (she pays no substantial regard to Christian values and Fabianism, the socialist ideology emphasizing the state’s welfare responsibilities that Nyerere was exposed to in Britain). Lal argues that *Ujamaa* should not be seen as developmentalist – a perspective Schneider represents – because the monolithic category of developmentalism ignores not only tensions with the concepts of *Ujamaa* and self-reliance, but it also obscures countercurrents (like the 1971 party guidelines, the *Mwongozo*) and conceals the fact that the state did not have a monopoly on power, as diverse actors attached very different meanings to official statements and sometimes acted on their own accords. The following chapters bear this out.

Chapter two investigates the drive to militarisation and cultural conformity as exemplified in constructions of gendered roles that national development discourses assigned to men and women. Lal – like Bjerk investigating the party’s youth wing and paramilitary institutions – finds that men were assigned roles of protecting and policing the nation, while women were relegated to the household sphere as mothers and guardians of the home.

Chapter number three zooms in on Mtwara region and integrates the interventions of the *Ujamaa* period in a *longue durée* view of strategies of survival, labour migration, and external interventions. Lal draws attention to Mtwara’s position as, first, a periphery within Tanzania and, secondly, a border region to Mozambique which was still in the midst of its liberation war against the Portuguese until 1974. Mtwara thus held a curious double position: While the central state hardly allocated resources to promote the region’s advancement or install even the most basic infrastructure of roads and water, it encouraged the welcoming of refugees from Mozambique and fostered vigilantism that was directed against any Portuguese subversion and possible “internal enemies.”
The fourth chapter scales the spatial unit of enquiry down even more and asks how the villagisation campaign played out – and has been remembered – in three villages of Mtwarra region. Lal finds that the experiences reach from “minimally disruptive to extremely dramatic” (Lal 2015: 180). She takes pains to show how certain groups, like local party officials and youths eager to break free from the authority of elders, capitalised on opportunities that arose from the (early) voluntary or (later) forced resettlements, while other groups, especially farmers who had to abandon their established plots, lost out. Written documentation on these processes is scant, but Lal has turned her reliance on oral accounts into an advantage. With the support of research assistants, she talked to a wide spectrum of actors and succeeded to realise over 100 hundred interviews, most of which were conducted with people from all walks of life from Mtwarra region, and the three villages in particular. The conversations equipped her with an array of narratives and experiences which enable her to juxtapose, for instance, the perspectives of those female officials who were responsible for rural education with those of the rural women who were trained. In an even more enlightening contrast, she places the memories of youth league activists responsible to enforce and push forward villagisation alongside the memories of those who were pushed, beaten and had their homesteads burned down.

Similar to Schneider, but with more clarity in drawing divisions and identifying positions, Lal unravels the fragmented and contested nature of the Tanzanian state and society, undermining the image of an overarching, consensually shared ideology and an omnipotent state apparatus. Consequently, she often abstains from clear-cut explanations and prefers to identify, as she writes in the introduction, “twists,” “turns,” “tensions,” “contradictions,” “ambiguities” and “inconsistencies” amidst a few “coherent historical patterns and axes of causation” (Lal 2015: 6). Authoritarianism and calls for cultural conformity are not rendered legitimate, as in Bjerk’s account, but rather embedded into the context of a global Cold War culture: fears of spies, strangers, subversive activity and foreigners were a trademark of the Cold War era not only in Tanzania, but also, for instance, in the United States. Opening the gaze for comparison provides a strong counter-narrative to the exoticising assumption that dictatorships are a dysfunctionality typical of African polities.
Although Lal tackles an enormous variety of themes and moves back and forth in time, the book keeps the reader both interested and oriented. The argument rests upon a firm empirical fundament. Only one claim – that “in actual practice, socialism and capitalism were overlapping” (Lal 2015: 232) – is not systematically backed up with evidence. But this is a minor flaw in a book that so skilfully interweaves oral and written sources, local and global spaces, social and cultural history, discourses and individual agency. It can wholeheartedly be recommended to both newcomers to Tanzanian history and African socialism as well as scholars who have already absorbed the large body of work on Ujamaa but are still open for fresh perspectives.

The Privatisation of Development

The fourth book under review here does not ignore Tanzania’s history of socialism, but focusses on the neoliberal era after the demise of Ujamaa. In The Development State. Aid, Culture and Civil Society in Tanzania, anthropologist Maia Green sets out to show that “[d]evelopment in Tanzania may have had limited success in bringing about the extent of change it promised, but the institutions and relations which promote it are perceived to be a rich source of opportunity for individuals to achieve what they define as development on their own terms” (Green 2014: 4). Opposing the view of development as an externally opposed order, Green aims to investigate development as a set of relations, both horizontal and vertical, and as a modality through which practices of government and popular culture are organised (Green 2014: 13).

The first of eight chapters sketches the genesis of the development state and draws attention to the fact that the community development approach, in which rural populations are supposed to contribute cash and labour to state projects, can be traced back to the late colonial era. Following this historical overview, the chapters two to six all deal in overlapping arguments with the nexus of participation, civil society, and management techniques. Firmly based on Green’s anthropological research and experience as a consultant – she first went to Tanzania in 1989 – the chapters reveal how the actors
involved attached very different meanings to the buzzwords of development (maendeleo) and participation, appropriating institutions and discourses to “develop” their own lives. Goals of personal development include, first and foremost, material aspects like the construction of a “modern” house and a diversified base of income to achieve a certain living standard and security, but also higher education of oneself and family members (Green 2014: 38, 50-51). External funds are instrumental in overcoming local resource constraints to achieve these goals. The meaning of msaada (“aid”) thus comprises more than the resources to implement project activities: aid, and the institutional structure surrounding it, is a stepping-stone in one’s personal trajectory. It is little wonder, then, that programmes which do not inject resources but only strive to “build organisational capacities” are rejected as mere “project[s] of words” (Green 2014: 114), as Green cites members of a women’s group involved in a micro-credit scheme. Green is careful not to discredit the aspirations of self-improvement and social mobility, but shows that usually, only few individuals are able to profit substantially from the localised interventions, whereas the majority goes away empty-handed. The approach of targeting the local and empowering the locals thus not only fails to address structural causes of “underdevelopment,” it also bolsters relations of dependency and inequality (Green 2014: 55).

Just like Schneider and Lal, Green finds that earlier anthropological studies drew but a “caricature of development as monolith” (Green 2014: 60). While she distances herself from such a view, she still emphasizes that there has been a “standardisation of development” (Green 2014: 56), as visible in the use of similar management and planning techniques across the globe, all of which aim to make social reality controllable. She identifies paradoxes of participatory concepts, she criticizes the narrow limits of political agency provided in project management techniques and argues that what aid organisations dub “local knowledge” is, in fact, hardly local, as neither in its origins nor in its application is it confined to a clearly circumscribed space.

The last section of the book introduces two new themes. Chapter 7 is about the modernization of an anti-witchcraft enterprise in Ulanga District (Green has dealt at length with witchcraft and ritual cleansing in previous publications, including Green 2005, 2007). Here, Green shows how the
content of the cleansing rituals has remained largely unchanged, while the form of their delivery and framing have become commercialised. It has become a service for “clients” who are lured with ad billboards and – reflecting the influence and appropriation of state-centred development practices – receive a pseudo-official, stamped certificate after the procedure that they are now cleansed. Chapter 8 deals with an emerging middle class culture in Tanzania. According to Green, the cultural transformations associated with economic opportunities exemplify Africa’s economic potential and are mirrored in everyday practices like shopping, shopkeeping, and setting money “to work” in varied economic ventures (Green 2014: 171).

These two final chapters of the book provide stimulating thoughts, but they do not interlock conclusively with the preceding ones. This aspect points to the book’s greatest weakness, which is its structure. Flaws like frequent repetitions, incoherence and important, but scattered references to Tanzania’s colonial and socialist past are less surprising if one takes into account that all of its single chapters were already published earlier as journal articles. Contemporary academic working conditions, marked by the principle of “publish or perish,” demand and reward such publication strategies in which articles receive more attention than monographs, but with sufficient efforts put into editing, this must not be a disadvantage: Bjerk, Lal, and Schneider, too, have re-used material of articles published earlier, but successfully streamlined their arguments.

The monograph’s strongest and most interesting arguments are those in which Green engages with concrete livelihood strategies and the webs of meaning into which these are embedded, drawing on her familiarity with the context. Green shows, for instance, that the strong preference for building houses as a matter of development can be interpreted as a balancing act between one’s own advancement on the one hand and the provision of support for claim-making relatives on the other hand: housebuilding is not only a means to conserve value (against inflation) but also allows “to invest in kinship, without having to redistribute everything for kin to consume” (Green 2014: 53). Such “investments” are seen as necessary in part because accumulation and display of wealth with provision or redistribution of resources may lead to accusations of
witchcraft, or implications in witchcraft. Other examples of insightful ethnography include sections in which Green articulates the aspects of patronage, professional status and workshop culture (Green 2014: 65-68) and maps the continuities of hierarchical relations in colonial and postcolonial, socialist and neoliberal modes of governance in chapter 5 – including both official and civil society institutions. It is a convincing conclusion that economic and political liberalisation did only partly lead to a “privatisation” of community development through civil society actors and investors, leading to a “hybrid institutional architecture” (Green 2014: 120).

In pushing forward her argument, Green continually engages with the vast literature on development. As this dialogue is sustained throughout the book, one gets the impression of a scattered and sometimes confusing rather than coherent, but illuminating theorisation. The often high level of abstraction and occasional lapses into jargon make reading at times cumbersome (chapter 8, for instance, aims to “show how the desires and aspirations of the emerging middle class are central to the enactment of what amounts to a particular instantiation of a ‘new economy’ in East Africa”, Green 2014: 160). Case studies deal with processes, settings, and techniques, to the detriment of actors. These – Green focusses on Tanzanians, not on expatriate development workers – remain mostly unnamed and silent. Where they appear, they do so as representatives of positions (e.g., the middle class) or carriers of roles in processes rather than complex individuals or heterogeneous groups. This is a methodological choice which has its pros and cons, however, a more extensive use of illustrative examples and direct quotes would have added to the persuasiveness of the analyses.

While much of the criticism of practices and concepts in development that Green brings forward is far from new, her study merits praise for its detailed treatment of a culture of development and the historical dimension that informs the ethnography. It is a thoughtful discussion of how development pervades everyday life, and vice versa, and how development is, nowadays, by no means confined to the state, but a matter of personal entrepreneurship as well.
Echoes and Distortions of the Past

While Schneider and Green are mostly critical of the Tanzanian state and *Ujamaa* ideology, Lal and Bjerk convey the feeling that there is much to be learned from the past. Taken together, the four books under review illustrate continuities and ruptures in Tanzania’s history and invite the reader to think about more than just personalities and presidents like Magufuli and Nyerere. Indeed, some aspects of the Tanzanian present appear like curiously distorted echoes from the past. Tanzania’s national slogan, coined during the freedom struggle, is *Uhuru na kazi* (“freedom/independence and work”). Magufuli’s rallying call, in contrast, has been *Hapa kazi tu* (“work and nothing else”). Green (2014: 179) notes that the instrument of the development plan, which had its heyday in Tanzania in the 1960s and 1970s, has reappeared again in 2011. As the government started counting again from zero, the current plan is dubbed the second Five Year Development Plan. With the issuing of the Five Year Development Plan 2016/17-2020/21, the Tanzanian government confirmed its ambition to transform the country into a semi-industrialised middle-income country until 2025 (URT 2016).

The Chinese are back as “partners” in development (although the accompanying rhetoric of brotherhood and friendship was far more convincing back in the 1960s) and are increasingly involved in shaping Tanzania’s landscape, both literally and institutionally. Lal (2015: 228), in her conclusion, points to the protests that were sparked by plans to construct a Chinese-funded pipeline from the southern region of Mtwara to Dar es Salaam. The gas reserves near Mtwara might make Tanzania the third largest gas exporter in the world, yet the central questions surrounding the resource- and growth-based development model in the nation-state recurred once again: Who benefits from the exploitation and processing of natural resources? How will the revenues be distributed? Who profits from investment in infrastructure? Who will have access to training and job opportunities? The relations between Dar es Salaam, the bustling economic and political centre, and Mtwara, the neglected internal periphery, became tense. During a demonstration in 2012, several protesters who demanded that a larger share of the resources should directly benefit
the population in Mtwara were gunned down by the state’s executive. Critics have aired worried comments that events like these might epitomize another instance of authoritarian development.

Lal points to other instances of a resurfacing, but filtered and instrumentalised past in which discursive tropes of *Ujamaa* are appropriated by present day policy-makers – without its humanistic, people-centered outlook (Lal 2015: 230). On the final page of her book, Lal warns that a complete dismissal of utopian visions and radical political projects plays into the hands of the proponents of extractive capitalism. A memory of *Ujamaa*’s manifold facets and investigations into the present “tensions of development” are important contributions to undermine both destructive and elite-oriented capitalism as well as the top-down authoritarianism in the implementation of “benevolent” ideas – in Tanzania or elsewhere.

**References**


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